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Article 2

T h e Utah Federal Court's Ban on
Sketching of Courtroom Scenes
M . Dallas Burnett*
Few constitutional rights are more fragile than those dealing with the
rights of free expression protected by the first amendment. The history
of press and speech freedom in the United States is littered with local,
state, and federal laws that have violated the letter and spirit of the constitutional guarantees.' Over the years the judiciary has played a major
role in preserving free expression against these attacks, but some courts
have also taken a turn at the undermining process.2 A recent example of
judicial infringement on freedom of the press and expression took place
in the United States District Court for the District of Utah in 1969 and
1973. That attack came in the form of a 1969 order prohibiting sketching in the courtroom and its environs and a 1973 amendment thereto
extending the prohibition to drawings of courtroom scenes regardless of
where made.
On May 8, 1969, Utah's federal district court promulgated a general
order prohibiting "the taking of photographs in any form, including the
taking of television pictures, and the making of artist's drawings, cartoons,
or caricatures in any form . . . in the courtroom or its environs . . .
*Professor of Communications, Chairman of the Department of Communications, Brigham
Young University. B.S., 1954, Brigham Young University; M.S.J., 1957, Ph.D., 1967, Northwestern University.
T h e author acknowledges the valuable research and editorial assistance rendered by Monte
Stewart of the Brigham Young University Law Review in the preparation of this article.
'Anyone's "dishonor roll" would have to include the Alien and Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat.
596 (1798) (expired 1801) which made it a felony to publish any writing with an intent to
resist, oppose, or defeat any law or act of Congress or the President. Also, the New York
statute upheld in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), prohibiting the publication of
any writing advising or teaching that organized government should be overthrown by any
unlawful means. And the Minnesota statute struck down in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931), which provided that any malicious, scandalous, and defamatory publication could
be declared a nuisance and further publication thereof enjoined.
21n 1826 a federal district court judge in Missouri, James H. Peck, held in contempt and
disbarred one Luke Lawless for publishing in a local newspaper an article criticizing a decision of the judge. Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 COLUM.
L.
REV.401,423-31 (1928).
In 1938, a labor leader in California sent a telegram to Frances Perkins, Rocsevelt's Secretary of Labor, in which he criticized a decision, calling it "outrageous," of a state trial court
judge. T h e labor leader was held in contempt. His conviction was upheld by the California
Supreme Court, Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 94 P.2d 983 (1939), but reversed
by a unanimous United States Supreme Court, Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
Also in 1938, a newspaper in Los Angeles published a series of editorials commenting o n
certain trials. T h e newspaper was held in contempt. On appeal to the California Supreme
Court, the conviction was upheld because the judicial proceedings commented on by the
offending editorials had not reached "such a point of finality as to form a proper subject of
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whether the court is in session or not."3 The order went uncontested.
On January 26, 1973, when drawings of a civil rights trial in federal court
were broadcast by a Salt Lake City television station, several staff members of the station were immediately ordered into court to show cause
why they should not be held in contempt for violation of the 1969 general
order. That hearing established that the drawings had been made in the
television studios from the artist's memory. The judge presiding at the
hearing dismissed the show cause order' but then amended the general
order to prohibit the making of "cartoons, artists' drawings caricatures,
or whatever they may be called, [whether] made on these premises or
elsewhere."5
This article will discuss the constitutionality of that order, particularly
the 1973 amendment that extends the authority of the judge from the
comment" and " [lliberty of the press is subordinated to the independence of the judiciary . . . ." Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 99, 106, 118, 98 P.2d 1029, 1033,
1044 (1940). T h e conviction was reversed by a unanimous United States Supreme Court.
Bridges v. California, supra.
See also United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972).
3General Order of the United States District Court for the District of Utah (May 8, 1969)
(emphasis added). The complete order reads:
Pursuant to the recommendation and resolution of the Judicial Conference of the
United States adopted March 8, 1962, the taking of photographs in any form, including
the taking of television pictures, and the making of artist's drawings, cartoons or caricatures in any form, and the broadcasting or recording for broadcasting by radio, television or other means, in the courtroom or its environs in connection with any judicial
proceedings are hereby prohibited, whether court is actually in session or not.
T h e term "environs" as used in this order means any place in the Post Ofice and
Federal Courthouse located at Fourth South and Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.
This rule does not apply to the use of copying machines such as Xerox. T h e court may
permit photographs to be taken or recordings to be made by or under the direction of
counsel and under such conditions as may be directed by the court. Dated this 8th day
of May, 1969.
It should be noted that the 1962 report of the Judicial Conference, to which reference was
made, contained no provisions whatsoever on sketching. ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICEOF THE
UNITEDSTATESCOURTS,REPORTS
OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE
OF THE
UNITED
STATES9-10 (1962). T h e limited references to sketching found in a 1968 report of a
Judicial Conference committee, COMMITTEE
ON THE OPERATION
OF THE JURY
SYSTEM,
JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED
STATES,
REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE
ON THE OPERATION
OF THE JURY
SYSTEM
ON THE "FREEPRESS-FAIR
TRIAL"
ISSUE(1968) (reported in 45 F.R.D. 391 (1969)) [hereinafter referred to as Kaufman Report], are discussed in text accompanying notes 21-24 infra.
4Transcript of Proceedings, In re KCPX Television Station, C 28-73 (D. Utah, proceedings
of Feb. 2, 1973).
51d. at 38-39.
T h e Utah district currently has two active federal district court judges: Chief Judge Willis
W. Ritter and Judge Aldon J. Anderson. T h e 1969 general order appeared over the signature
of Chief Judge Ritter. Chief Judge Ritter was also the presiding judge at the 1973 hearing
and it was he who at that hearing promulgated the amendment extending the sketching ban
to all sketches of courtroom scenes regardless where made.
Judge Anderson has indicated that the practice in his court regarding sketching is uniform
with the practice in Chief Judge Ritter's court. Interview with Judge Aldon J . Anderson,
United States District Court for the District of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah (telephone), Jan. 20,
1975. Though Judge Anderson prohibits in-court sketching, it is unclear whether he views
the prohibition as extending to sketches made from memory.
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courtroom and its environs to the desks of those who make news decisions
for the press.

For centuries, sketches have been used to report judicial proceedings
to the nonattending public. Particularly in America, sketches of courtroom scenes have been a widely used news-reporting medium. Scenes
from the Salem witchcraft trial^,^ the trials of religious nonconformists
, ~ the free press trial of John
Roger Williams7 and Anne H u t c h i n s ~ nand
Peter Zengerg were sketched by eyewitnesses and contemporaneously
published. In fact, few if any notable trials -from those early colonial
trials mentioned above to the recent trials of the Watergate conspirators have failed to be recorded for news publication by artists present at the
proceedings.l o
In the present century, because of the advent of modern photography
and photojournalism, the use of sketches for general news purposes has
waned. Yet sketches of in-court scenes continue to be widely used because of the nearly universal ban imposed by the American judiciary on
the use of television or photography equipment in the courtrooms.ll
Indeed, sketches of in-court scenes, under presently existing strictures,
constitute the only visual medium by which the news of the courtroom
can be conveyed to the general public.
Sketches of courtroom scenes are particularly important to television
news reporting. Severely limited -compared to the newspaper - in
the number of minutes and words it can employ to convey the news, the
television news program compensates with greater use of sight, sound,
and movement. The unique advantage of television news reporting is
its ability to let the viewer see the news. Deprived of the use of sketches
of courtroom scenes, the television news program is reduced - if it is to
report the goings-onat judicial proceedings at all - to a reading over the
air of an abbreviated newspaper account.12
6W.C.H. WOOD8c R. GABRIEL,
AMERICA:
ITSPEOPLE
AND VALUES
75 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as WOOD].
'H.B. WILDER,
D. LUDLUM
8c P. BROWN,
THIS
IS AMERICA'S
STORY107 (3d ed. 1968).
*WOOD
77.
91d. at 112.
A PICTORIAL
HISTORY
OF THE WORLD'S
GREATTRIALS
FROM
1°B. AYMAR8c E. SAGARIN,
SOCRATES
TO EICHMAN
(1967) contains an extensive collection of sketches, drawings, and paintings depicting trials and judicial proceedings through the centuries.
"The ban on photography and television in the courtroom is discussed at note 13 infra.
The wide use of trial sketches is demonstrated by the fact that the National Broadcasting
Company (NBC), in 1973, televised nationally on the NBC Nightly News at least 49 sketches
of trial scenes. Brief for Applicant at 5, Application of National Broadcasting Co., 64 N.J. 476,
317 A.2d 695 (1974). There is evidence that similar extensive use of such sketches is made by
the other national television networks. Id.
12See

COLUMHI
A BROADCASTING
SYSTEM,
INC.,TELEVISION
NEWSREPORTING
1 16 (1958), where
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But despite its unobtrusive nature and its long tradition as a news conveying tool, the sketching of courtroom scenes has sometimes been restricted by rules aimed at curtailing media coverage of trials generally.l3
television's dependence on visual representations is explained:
Because one of its chief concerns is to allow its viewer to see the news, television has freed
itself from the obligation of the newspaper to make the news clear through printed words.
Its purpose is to outline, to bring to its audience's eye and mind much of the same news
a paper prints. In many ways, the television news program faces what seem insurmountable obstacles; so it appears that its problems are far more complex than those of a newspaper. Its dimensions, though less than the newspaper's in terms of time and space, are
increased in the areas of sight, sound, and movement. Television news has these three
vital and essential qualities to help it report the news.
13Historically in America, the promulgation of judicial restrictions on media coverage of
trials has occurred as the third phase of a three-fold phenomenon. The first element of the
phenomenon is the crime or other underlying fact situation with its resulting trial, all marked
by a particular convergence of personalities, facts, and circumstances that make for heightened
newsworthiness. Second, the media then responds with extensive and pervasive pretrial and
trial coverage. The affair becomes notorious, heavily publicized, and highly sensational; public
interest in the proceedings becomes intense. A judicial reaction to all this often follows. T h e
judiciary declares that the extensive coverage and attendant public interest was detrimental
to the right of the accused to a fair trial and to the essential dignity of judicial proceedings
and therefore promulgates orders restricting media coverage of future cases. This three-fold
pattern has appeared repeatedly in the present century.
T h e trial of Bruno Hauptmann, the alleged kidnapper of the Lindbergh child, was accompanied by probably the most massive pretrial and trial publicity of any criminal case in
American history up to that time. The trial itself was broadcast live over the radio. See
S. WHIPPLE,
THETRIAL
OF BRUNO
RICHARD
HAUF~MANN
46-47 (no date); G. WALLER,
KIDNAP:
THESTORYOF THE LINDBERGH
CASE252-53 (1961). After conviction, Hauptmann appealed,
assigning as error, inter alia, the massive and prejudicial pretrail publicity and the confusion
caused during trial by members of the press, their clerks, and messenger boys. The conviction was upheld, State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809 (Ct. Err. & App.), cert. denied,
296 US. 649 (1935), and Hauptmann was executed. S. WHIPPLE,supra at 88-89. But the
trial acted as a catalyst in the legal profession and intensified the concern with "the dangers
attendant upon the use of radio in connection with trials." See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,
596-601 (1965) (appendix to opinion of Harlan, J., concurring, consisting of portions of
amicus curiae brief of the American Bar Association). See also 62 A.B.A. REP. 851-66 (1937).
In 1937, the American Bar Association adopted canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
which barred taking of photographs in the courtroom and the broadcasting of court proceedings. 62 A.B.A. REP. 1 123, 1 134 (1937). The canon originally read:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The
taking of photographs in the courtroom, during sessions of the court or recesses between
sessions, and the broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the
essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the court and create misconceptions with
respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted.
With the advent of television, canon 35 was amended by inserting a ban on the "televising"
of court proceedings. 77 A.B.A. REP. 110-11 (1952). A large majority of the states adopted
canon 35 and in 1946 the essence of the canon was embodied in rule 53 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure which now reads:
The taking of photographs in the court room during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the court room shall not be
permitted by the court.
Both canon 35 and rule 53 were aimed at media coverage of trial proceedings. Neither
attempted to reach or deal with pretrial publicity. In 1959, however, the United States
Supreme Court reversed a criminal conviction solely because of prejudicial news articles read
by the jurors. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959). The scope and potential impact
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of that decision were limited, though, because it was based on supervisory and not constitutional grounds. Yet within 2 years, the Court invoked the due process clause to strike down a
murder conviction of a state court on the ground that massive adverse publicity had created an
atmosphere of "sustained excitement," "strong prejudice," and "public passion." Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). This opened the floodgate on appeals alleging prejudicial publicity resulting in denial of due process. See R. Ainsworth, Fair Trial - Free Press, 45 F.R.D.
417, 419 (1969). Supreme Court activity in the area of prejudicial publicity in criminal trials
continued, reaching a peak in the 1965 and 1966 terms with decisions in the cases of Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
In 1962, when Texas brought criminal charges against the fertilizer tank swindler, Billie
Sol Estes, it was only one of two states not subscribing to canon 35; in Texas, broadcasting of
STATE
trials was allowed in certain circumstances. JUDICIAL
CANON28 OF THE INTEGRATED
BAROF TEXAS,27 TEX.B.J. 102 (1964). T h e trial of Estes received nationwide publicity and
parts of the proceedings were televised. T h e Supreme Court held that the defendant was deprived of due process because of the confusion in the courtroom caused by large numbers of
rather too eager photographers and the subtle psychological impact that awareness of the
televising was deemed to have on all trial participants. Estes v. Texas, supra. But the decision rendered in the Sheppard case was to have ultimately the greatest impact on press coverage of judicial proceedings.
Dr. Sam Sheppard was accused of the murder ofhis young, pretty, and pregnant wife. During
the course of the investigation, and on through trial, every detail of the crime was widely
publicized. The newspapers in the area, in front-page stories, began calling for the arrest of
Sheppard. After the arrest, the newspapers and other media alleged the defendant to be "a
bare-faced liar," a "Jekyll-Hyde," and a "perjuror." Much emphasis was placed on the defendant's love affair with another woman, and wide circulation was given to the claim of a
woman convict that Sheppard was the father of her illegitimate child. T h e trial itself was
later described by appellate courts as amounting to a carnival and a Roman holiday because
of the activities of the press. T h e Supreme Court reversed Dr. Sheppard's conviction on the
grounds that massive prejudicial publicity and pervasive news coverage of the trial had deprived the defendant of due process and a fair trial. Yet the Court went further: it recommended and even demanded that courts in the future take remedial measures to prevent
"prejudice at its inception." Specifically, the Court (1) emphasized the power inherent in the
trial judge to control and even limit the presence of the press in the courtroom and environs;
(2) stated that the trial court should have insulated the witnesses; and most importantly, (3)
concluded that the trial court shouId have prohibited extrajudicial statements prejudicial
to the defendant made by any person subject to the court's control: parties, witnesses, attorneys,
court officials, and law enforcement officers. Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra.
Following Sheppard there was a spate of reports recommending guidelines for and limitations on media coverage of judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Kaufman Report, note 3 supra;
ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
ON FAIRTRIAL
AND FREEPRESS,ABA PROJECT
ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE,STANDARDS
RELATING
TO FAIRTRIAL
AND FREE PRESS
- TENTATIVE
DRAFT(1966) APPROVED
DRAFT(1968) [hereinafter cited as Reardon Report] ; ASSOCIATION
OF
THE BAROF THE CITYOF NEW YORK,SPECIAL
COMMIITEE
ON RADIO,TELEVISION,
AND THE
ADMINI~TRATION
OF JUSTICE,FREEDOM
OF THE PRESSAND FAIRTRIAL,FINALREPORTWITH
RECOMMENDATIONS
(1967) [hereinafter cited as the Illedina Report]. Some recommendations
were incorporated into the local rules of various state and federal trial courts. T h e central
theme of the reports was that trial courts could, and in appropriate cases should, prohibit the
divulgence, by persons connected with the case, of information prejudicial to the parties or
otherwise inimical to a fair trial. Because of recognized constitutional strictures, the reports
generally recommended that no ban be placed on or penalty imposed for publication of any
information regarding a case once divulged. For example, the Kaufman Report stated:
T h e Committee does not presently recommend any direct curb or restraint on publication by the press of potentially prejudicial material. Such a curb, it feels, is both unwise
as a matter of policy and poses serious constitutional problems.
Id. at 45 F.R.D. 401-02 (emphasis added). Evidence has appeared establishing that in some
jurisdictions, trial courts are with increasing frequency imposing bans on prosecutors, police
officers, witnesses, and others from divulging information in criminal cases likely to receive
pretrial publicity. See Warren & Abell, Free Press - Fair Trial: The "Gag Order," A Cali-
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In 1949, New Jersey became the first state jurisdiction to ban sketching
in the courtroom.14 Prior to that year, the New Jersey courts had operated under canon 35 of the American Bar Association's Judicial Canons
of Ethics which banned photography and television from the courtroom
but was silent as to sketching.lS But the New Jersey Supreme Court then
amended the canon to provide that "the making of sketches of the courtroom or of any persons in it during sessions of the court or recesses between sessions . . . should not be permitted. "I6 New Jersey remained the
only state which prohibited in-court sketching until 1971 when the
Rhode Island Supreme Court framed a similar rule.17 Apparently
neither state, however, banned the sketching of courtroom scenes from
memory.
In 1974 the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) successfully petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court for a modification of its sketching
rule. In a reported decision,lB the New Jersey Supreme Court decided
as a matter of policy that the ban on sketching should be removed. Coincidentally with the granting of the NBC petition, the court adopted the
new Code of Judicial Conduct of the American Bar Association, noting
that the Code "contains no prohibition against sketching judicial proceedings in a courtroom, in the manner described."lg Rhode Island remains the only state that prohibits in-court sketching.
Judicial limitations on sketching in the federal courts have had a more
varied history. Among the flurry of studies, reports, and monographs on
fornia Aberrution, 45 S. CAL. L. h v . 51 (1972). However, court-imposed prohibitions on
publication of such information once divulged have been relatively rare though certainly not
nonexistent. See, e.g., United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972).
14Brief for Applicant at 2-3, Application of National Broadcasting Co., 64 N. J. 476, 317 A.2d
695 (1974).
Hereafter in the text, sketching done in the courtroom will be referred to as in-court sketching. Sketching of courtroom scenes done from memory at locations other than the courtroom or its environs will be referred to, at times, as sketching from memory.
l5Zd. at 2-3.
161d. at 3.

''109 R.I. 968 (1971). T h e pertinent paragraph, 7 30, Provisional Order No. 9, CANONS
OF
JUDICIAL
ETHICSFOR THE STATEOF RHODEISLAND,
reads:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting conduct and decorum. T h e
taking of photographs or sketching in the court room and the broadcasting or televising
of court proceedings detract from the essential dignity of the court and should not be
permitted.
T h e restriction shall not apply to substantially ceremonial proceedings, such as proceedings involving admission of applicants to the bar or admission of applicants for
naturalization.
As of January 20, 1975, the Rhode Island Supreme Court was not considering either modifying or deleting the in-court sketching ban. Also as of that date, no petition for modification
of or attack on the ban had been commenced by interested parties. Letter from Walter J.
Kane, Head Clerk, Rhode Island Supreme Court, to Brigham Young University Law Review,
January 20, 1975.
18Applicationof National Broadcasting Co., 64 N.J. 476, 317 A.2d 695 (1974).
l91d. at 478,317 A.2d at 697.
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fair trial and free press appearing in the wake of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Sheppard v . Maxwell,2oonly one made any
reference to or suggestion concerning in-court sketching. The Kaufman
Report, a report prepared by a committee of the Federal Judicial Conference, contained suggestions for special orders applicable to "widely publicized and sensational cases."21 Such cases were defined in the report
as those "likely to receive massive publicity and where the court's standing rules and orders might be inadequate to eliminate prejudicial influences from the courtroom."22 One of those special orders provides that
the court may direct "that the names and addresses of jurors or prospective jurors not be publicly released except as required by statute, and
that no photograph be taken or sketch made of any juror within the
environs of the court."23 TO date three federal district courts have
adopted, for use only in "widely publicized and sensational cases," the
narrowly drawn "special order" suggestions of the Kaufman Report.24
Other than the ban promulgated by the Utah federal district court,
there is only one instance of a federal judge imposing a blanket ban on
the sketching of courtroom scenes wherever made and on the publication
of such sketches. In the summer of 1973, the federal government began
the criminal prosecution of certain members of the Vietnam Veterans
Against the War, individuals popularly known as the "Gainesville Eight,"
who were accused of conspiring to disrupt the 1972 Republican National
Convention. During pretrial proceedings, the trial judge announced
orally from the bench a ban on in-court sketching during the course of the
Gainesville Eight trial. When the judge became aware later that certain
artists were sketching courtroom scenes from memory at locations outside
the courtroom, he amended his order to state "that no sketches for publication of proceedings in the courtroom or its environs were to be made,
even though such sketches were made not in the courtroom or its
environs but from memory . . . . Soon after this order was promulgated,
which was applicable only to the rather notorious Gainesville Eight trial,
the trial judge issued a written general order imposing a blanket ban on
sketches, regardless of where made, of scenes from the judge's courtroom
and on publication of the same; the ban extended to all proceedings then
pending or thereafter to be brought before the judge.25
Appeals were taken from the court's orders and from contempt con"

20384 U.S. 333 (1966). See note 13 supra.
21Kaufman Report, supra note 3, at 45 F.R.D. 409.
221d.
231d. at 45 F.R.D. 410-11 .
24S.D. Ind., Rule 29(5); D. Minn., Rule 7(c)(5); and W.D. Okla., Rule 26(m)(5). See note
29 infru.
25Facts are taken from statement of facts in the appellate court's decision. United States v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974).
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victions arising out of violations of the sketching and publication ban.26
A unanimous Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of United States
v . Columbia Broadcusting System2?held that the orders were unconstitutionally overbroad and accordingly directed that they be vacated.28
It appears, then, that as of the present time only in the state courts of
Rhode Island and in Utah's federal courts is in-court sketching prohibited. Only Utah 's federal courts prohi bit sketches of courtroom
scenes made from mem0ry.~9

The Utah federal court's sketching ban is analytically divisible into
two parts: (1) the prohibition on in-court sketching and (2) the prohibition on the making and publication of drawings of courtroom scenes regardless of where made.3O This article will examine the latter aspect of
261d.(appeal from the orders); United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 497 F.2d 107
(5th Cir. 1974) (appeal from conviction of criminal contempt); Columbia Broadcasting Sys.
v. Arnow, 497 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1974) (petition for mandamus dismissed as moot); National
Broadcasting Co. v. Arnow, 497 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1974) (petition for mandamus dismissed as
moot).
27497F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974).
28The conviction of criminal contempt was reversed on a finding that the district judge
should have disqualified himself. United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 497 F.2d 107
(5th Cir. 1974).
8C J. WILLS,FEDERAL
29The survey of federal district court rules was made using H. FISCHER
LOCAL
COURTRULES(1975 repl.). Not all federal district courts have local rules in effect. T h e
district court of Utah is among that group. Id. at xiii. Whenever a district court promulgates local rules or amendments thereto, the court is directed to furnish copies of those rules
a n d amendments to the United States Supreme Court. FED.R. CIV.P. 83. Apparently, neither
the 1969 general order prohibiting in-court sketching nor the 1973 amendment thereto of
Utah's federal district court was sent to the Supreme Court as required by rule 83 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
For the information on state court practices, reliance was placed on a survey found in Brief
for Applicant at 14-15, Application of National Broadcasting Co., 64 N.J. 476, 317 A.2d 695
(1974).
S0It may be argued that the court intended to prohibit only the making of sketches from
memory and not the publication of the same. T h e difficulty in interpretation arises because
the amended general order is ambiguous. It reads:
The broadcasting or reporting for broadcasting by the radio, television, or other means,
including the newspapers, whether done in the courtroom or its environs, in connection
with any judicial proceeding, is hereby prohibited, whether court is actually in session
or not - and emphasize- whether the cartoons, artists' drawings, caricatures, or whatever they may be called, are made on these premises o r elsewhere.
Transcript of Proceedings at 38-39, I n re KCPX Television Station, C 28-73 (D. Utah, proceedings of Feb. 2,1973).
But there is rather clear evidence that the court's prohibition is meant to include publication of sketches of courtroom scenes. The 1973 show cause order, see text accompanying
note 4 supra, was directed to KCPX Television Station; Harold Woolley, the vice president
and general manager of the station; Art Kent, the news director; and Allan Moll, Linda Ormes,
and Sandy Gilmour, all news reporters of the station. T h e artist of the offending sketches,
a Mr. Eduard Brijs, was not even named in the show cause order though he did appear as a
witness a t the hearing. Id. at 8-14.
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the court's order in the context of three constitutional doctrines or
principles: prior restraint on expression, public trials, and overbreadth.
The three arguments advanced in support of the sketching ban -protection of privacy, protection of reputational interests, and elimination
of a chilling effect on the right to litigate -will also be examined. Finally, the article will analyze the more narrow aspect of the court's order the ban on in-court sketching.
Before proceeding with the analysis of the sketching ban, however, it
should be noted what issues and principles of law are not raised by the
prohibition. First, it may be thought that the ban is merely an extension
of general principles articulated in the Supreme Court's decision in
Estes v . Texm,3l where photography and especially television were
banned from the courtroom on due process grounds. Such is not the case.
Estes banned television and photography from the courtroom because
(1) they were deemed disruptive and (2) they were deemed to have a
subtle and adverse pyschological impact on jurors, witnesses, and other
trial participants. These considerations are irrelevant to an analysis of
sketching of courtroom scenes done outside of the courtroom. These
same considerations appear to have a minimal relevancy to sketching
done in court because drawing is generally as unobtrusive as taking written notes and can be carried on without the awareness of trial participants. In short, the principles and policies examined in Estes are only
indirectly, if at all, of importance in a discussion of the Utah sketching
ban.
Second, the sketching ban is not an attempt at resolution of afair trialfree press conflict. That may appear as a surprising assertion, but it becomes evident as one understands what the courts mean by a fair trial in
a society that guarantees a free press. The Supreme Court confronted
where the
the fair trial-free press conflict in Sheppard v . Ma~well,3~
Court found that massive and adverse publicity attendant upon a criminal trial can so taint the proceeding that the accused is denied due process,
to wit, a fair trial conducted before unbiased and unprejudiced jurors.
The Court, which earlier in Estes had looked at the prejudice resulting
from news-gathering activities, in Sheppard focused on the content of
news reports. The particular concern was that the content might bias
potential and empaneled jurors. T h e Court firmly directed that trial
judges take certain steps to control publicity before and during trials in
those criminal cases in which publicity might jeopardize an accused's
Further, it is mere sophistry to argue that a prohibition on the making of a sketch is not
constitutionally offensive because such a prohibition does not extend to publication. Since
the making of a sketch constitutes a component part of the publication process, to prohibit
the making of a sketch is to prevent publication. An order need not use the word publication
to constitute in fact a prohibition of that activity.
3l38 1 U.S. 532 (1965). See note 13 supra.
s2384U.S. 333 (1966). See note 13 supra.
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chances for a fair trial. The conflict between fair trial and free press,
therefore, as that conflict is normally viewed, arises when a court seeks to
preserve an unbiased panel of jurors during a criminal proceeding by
restricting, in any of a variety of ways, media coverage of any stage of a
criminal prosecution.33
However, the goal of the Utah sketching ban apparently is not to
ensure an unbiased panel of jurors for criminal trials. The court did
not advance such as a goal of the sketching ban at the time the ban was
promulgated. Indeed, if the court were attempting to protect potential
or empaneled jurors from prejudicial publicity, arguably the prohibition would have included other means of publicity, such as written reports in newspapers and verbal accounts on television. It is rather clear
that the ban was promulgated not to ensure fair criminal trials but to
protect privacy, reputational interests, and the right to litigate.34 The
court said as much at the time it imposed the ban. The Utah federal
court viewed sketching, apparently, as uniquely harmful to those latter
interests and thus singled out the sketching medium for prohibition.
For these reasons the sketching ban must be viewed as only tangentially,
if at all, concerned with implementing the fair trial-free press guidelines of Sheppard v .
Such, then, are the issues the sketching ban does not raise. Turning to
the issues raised, the first is the operation of the sketching ban as a prior
restraint.

A . The Sketching Ban as a Prior Restraint on E x ~ r e s s i o n ~ ~
Speaking generally, any official restriction that operates directly to
prevent or prohibit expression in advance of publication is a prior restraint. Prior restraint is thus distinguished from subsequent punishment which is a penalty imposed on the publisher after publication for
having made the communication. Such a penalty may certainly induce
self-censorship because of the publisher's desire to avoid the threatened
sanction, and the chilling effect of the threatened and subsequent penalty
can itself constitute grounds for constitutional attack. But under a system of subsequent punishment no official action is taken to stop com33See, e.g., Kaufman Report, supra note 3; Reardon Report, supra note 13; Medina Report,
supra note 13.
W e e notes 66-67 and accompanying text infra.
35384 U.S. 333 (1 966).
36The Supreme Court first invoked the doctrine of prior restraint in Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931), and has since employed the doctrine on numerous occasions. See, e.g., New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S.
58 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
The classic analysis of the prior restraint doctrine continues to be Emerson, The Doctrine
of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW& CONTEMP.
PROB.648 (1955). A more current treatment of the
doctrine is found in Note, Prior Restraint and the Press Following the Pentagon Papers Cases Is the Immunity Dissolving?, 47 NOTREDAMELAW.927 (1972).
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munication before the event, whereas a system of prior restraint, if successfully implemented, prevents the expression from being made at a11.37
Though it has followed the prior restraint-subsequent punishment
distinction,38 the Supreme Court has never given a narrow, limiting definition to the concept of prior restraint.39 However, the recent Pentagon
Papers cases40 offer a classic example of the operation of the doctrine.
After the New York T i m e s and other newspapers began publication of
certain materials, the Government acted to prevent further publication.
The Supreme Court declared that the order secured by the Government
enjoining publication constituted a prior restraint, which, under all of
the facts of the case, was constitutionally impermissible.
37As stated in Emerson, supra note 36, at 648:
T h e concept of prior restraint, roughly speaking, deals with official restrictions imposed upon speech or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication. Prior
restraint is thus distinguished from subsequent punishment, which is a penalty imposed
after the communication has been made as a punishment for having made it. Again
speaking generally, a system of prior restraint would prevent communication from occurring at all; a system of subsequent punishment allows the communication but imposes a
penalty after the event. Of course, the deterrent effect of a later penalty may operate to
prevent a communication from ever being made. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons,
the impact upon freedom of expression may be quite different, depending upon whether
the system of control is designed to block publication in advance or deter it by subsequent
punishment.
In constitutional terms, the doctrine of prior restraint holds that the First Amendment
forbids the Federal Government to impose any system of prior restraint, with certain
limited exceptions, in any area of expression that is within the boundaries of that Amendment. By incorporating the First Amendment in the Fourteenth Amendment, the same
limitations are applicable to the states.
38Though the prior restraint -subsequent punishment distinction has been criticized,
Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND.L. h v . 533, 544 (1951); Note, Prior
. REV. 1001, 1006 (1949),
Restraint - A Test of Invalidity in Free Speech Cases, 49 G L U M L.
it is dear that the Court in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), considered the distinction
crucial. In fact, the four dissenters stated that the "Minnesota statute does not operate as a
previous restraint on publication within the proper meaning of that phrase." Id. at 735 (emphasis in original).
T h e prior restraint - subsequent punishment distinction is often traced to a famous passage
by Blackstone:
T h e liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in
laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for
criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what
sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the
press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the
consequence of his own temerity.
4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
* 151-52.
39Speaking for a unanimous Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241,256 (1974), Chief Justice Burger said:
T h e Florida [right to reply] statute operates as a command in the same sense as a statute
or regulation forbidding appellant from publishing specified matter. Governmental
restraint on publishing need not fall into familiar or traditional patterns to be subject
to constitutional limitations on governmental powers. Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233,244-45 (1936).
Id. (emphasis added).
40NewYork Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1975:

When, in the Pentagon Papers cases, the Supreme Court struck down
the Government's injunction, it was merely attaching well-established
legal consequences to a finding of prior restraint. With certain limited
exceptions, any governmental system of prior restraint is prohibi ted.4l
Or, in the words of the Court, a prior restraint on expression carries a
"heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."42 The weight
of that presumption is demonstrated by the paucity of cases sustaining an
activity operating as a prior re~traint.~3
A judge can impose a constitutionally valid prior restraint only in exceptional and extremely limited circumstances.
[B] efore a prior restraint may be imposed by a judge, even in the interest
41Emerson, supra note 36, at 648.
42Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). See New York Times v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 814 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
419 (1971).
431n Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1931), Chief Justice Hughes indicated that
there are certain exceptions to the absolute prohibition against prior restraints:
T h e objective has also been made that the principle as to immunity from previous
restraint is stated too broadly, if every such restraint is deemed to be prohibited. That is
undoubtedly true; the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited.
But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases: "When a nation is at war
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard
them as protected by any constitutional right." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52.
No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its
recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops. O n similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications. T h e security of the community life may be protested
against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government.
T h e constitutional guaranty of free speech does not "protect a man from an injunction
against uttering words that may have all the effect of force. Gornpers v. Buck Stove 6.
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439." Schenck v . United States, supra. These limitations are not
applicable here.
Id. (footnote omitted).
I n shorthand form, the exceptions are national security, obscenity, and fighting words.
Only the obscenity exception has been invoked with any degree of success, see, e.g., Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), but even in the obscenity area a prior restraint must
overcome a heavy presumption against its constitutionality. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58 (1963) (striking down a system of prior administrative restraints on obscenity).
T h e Government has met marked failure in its efforts to invoke the national security exception. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971), where Justice
Brennan stated in his concurring opinion:
Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly,
and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a
transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order.
See also Note, The National Security Exception to the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 13 W M 8t
.
MARYL. &v. 214 (1971).
Fighting words are almost exclusively dealt with by subsequent punishment rather than by
prior restraint. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 314 U.S. 568 (1942).
Other possible exceptions to the prohibition of prior restraints, dubbed "ministerial restraints" and "news management," are discussed in Note, Prior Restraint and the Press Following the Pentagon Papers Cases - Is the Immunity Dissolving?, 47 NOTREDAMELAW.927,
944-48 (1972).
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of assuring a fair trial, there must be "an imminent, not merely a likely,
threat to the administration of justice. T h e danger must not be remote
or even probable; it must immediately imperil."44

Thus, when a judge, in the absence of immediately imperiling circumstances, prohibits a reporter from communicating what he witnesses in
court, the prohibition constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on
communication. T o give an example, a federal district court judge
sitting in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, ordered that "no report of the testimony taken in this case today shall be made in any newspaper or by radio
or television, or by another news media." Two reporters violated the
order by publishing an account of what they had witnessed in court. The
result was a contempt conviction and an appeal therefrom. A unanimous
Fifth Circuit Court ofAppeals, in the case of United States v . D i c k i n ~ o n / ~
struck down the order as an impermissible prior restraint. Chief Judge
John R. Brown, speaking for the court, said:
T h e initial question with which we are confronted concerns the constitutionality of the District Court's order. Sympathetic as we are to the
legitimate objective earnestly pursued by the conscientious Trial Judge
(preservation of an impartial venire within the local community whenever the state criminal prosecution should reach trial), we must conclude
that a blanket ban on publication of Court proceedings so far transgresses First Amendment freedoms that any such absolute proscription
"cannot withstand the mildest breeze emanating from the Constitution."46

In constitutional contemplation there is no difference between a
journalist writing down what he has previously observed in court and
a journalist-artist drawing the same.47 The Utah federal court's ban on
sketching courtroom scenes from memory is in substance the same type
of prior restraint struck down by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Dickinson. T h e order there and the Utah order were framed to prevent
expression, to prohibit before the fact the making of a communication.
--

-

44United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 497 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367,376 (1947)).
45465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972).
46Zd. at 500 (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of West Palm Beach, 457 F.2d
1016, 1017 (5th Cir. (1972)).
471f there is an intent to communicate and an element of communicativeness present in the
conduct, such will be treated in constitutional adjudication as expression or "speech" within
the meaning of the first amendment. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Tinker v.
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Spence v. Washington, supra, for example,
a student hung an American flag, upside down with a peace sign attached thereto, out of his
window. T h e Court concluded that such was protected expression because " [a] n intent to
convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." Id. 410-11.
A sketching of a courtroom scene by an artist-journalist intended for publication is likewise within the meaning of "expression" and as such is entitled to constitutional protection.
T h e contrary cannot seriously be argued.
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The Utah order in particular was not framed to counter an imminent
and immediately imperiling danger to the administration of justice. The
sketching ban, as a prior restraint on expression, cannot, therefore, "withstand the mildest breeze emanating from the Constitution."
B. T h e Sketching Ban and the Guarantees of Public Trial
Not only does the broad sketching ban constitute unconstitutional
censorship, it operates in derogation of the constitutional mandate that
what transpires in the courtroom shall be
That guarantee of
public trial is embodied in part in the sixth amendment, which deals with
criminal proceedings.49 Arguably, it is also an integral part of fifth and
48The Supreme Court in Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) declared:
A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public property . . . . Those
who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity. There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of
democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in proceedings before it.
Id. (emphasis added). Only several months later, the Court in I n re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
266-71 (1948), articulated the meaning of a public trail in the American tradition.
This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots
in our English common law heritage. T h e exact date of its origin is obscure, but it likely
evolved long before the settlement of our land as an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial. In this country the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial
first appeared in a state constitution in 1776. Following the ratification in 1791 of the
Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment, which commands that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . ." most of the original states and those subsequently admitted to the Union adopted similar constitutional
provisions. Today almost without exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial
decision, requires that all criminal trials be open to the public.
T h e traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has been variously ascribed
to the notorious use of this practice by the Spanish Inquisition, to the excesses of the
English Court of Star Chamber, and to the French monarchy's abuse of the lettre de
cachet. All of these institutions obviously symbolized a menace to liberty. I n the hands
of despotic groups each of them had become an instrument for the suppression of
political and religious heresies in ruthless disregard of the right of an accused to a fair
trial. Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his trial be conducted in
public may confer upon our society, the guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. T h e
knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum
of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power. One need
not wholly agree with a statement made on the subject by Jeremy Bentham over 120 years
ago to appreciate the fear of secret trials felt by him, his predecessors and contemporaries.
Bentham said: ". . . suppose the proceedings to be completely secret, and the court, on
the occasion, to consist of no more than a single judge, - that judge will be at once indolent and arbitrary: how corrupt soever his inclination may be, it will find no check,
at any rate no tolerably efficient check, to oppose it. Without publicity, all other checks
are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other institutions might present themselves in the character
of checks, would be found to operate rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks in reality, as
checks only in appearance."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
49The sixth amentment states, in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . ." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
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fourteenth amendment guarantees of due process and thus a requirement of civil trials.50 Substantial authority indicates that the guarantee
of public trials belongs not only to the accused and other parties to an
~
actions to ensure a public
action but to the public as ~ e l l . 5Numerous
trial have been commenced and successfully prosecuted by the media
where the media was asserting not jus tertii rights and claims, that is,
those of the accused, but rather the right of the media to report on courtroom proceedings and the right of the public to know of the same.52 In
fact, society's interest in public trials will prevail over the accused's request for a secret, private proceeding.53
Over the years, courts have articulated the policies underlying the tradition and mandate of public trials. First, public trials operate as a reS0The assertion that public civil trials are guaranteed by due process provisions has two
underpinnings: policy and tradition. Civil trials have traditionally been open to the public
and to representatives of the media. T h e pleadings and transcripts are of public record.
A closed civil proceeding is probably more rare in the American justice system than a closed
criminal proceeding since a large number of "criminal" cases involve juvenile defendants and
are thus, to a greater or lesser degree depending on the jurisdiction, closed to the public.
T h e policies advanced in support of public trials often arise out of a criminal trial context,
but they apply with equal cogency to civil proceedings. For a discussion of these policies see
notes 54-57 and accompanying text infra.
51As the court stated in United States ex. rel. Mayberry v. Yeager, 321 F. Supp. 199, 204
(D.N.J. 1971):
If a public trial was not accorded to the petitioner, the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682
(1948). Public trial is essentially a right of the accused. Geise v. United States, 265 F.2d 659
(9 Cir. 1959). There is, however, a correlative right to presewe the public's right to be informed about criminal prosecutions in the best interests of all citizens. Lewis v. Peyton,
352 F.2d 791 (4 Cir. 1965);United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3 Cir. 1949).
Id. (emphasis added). But see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,588 (Harlan, J., concurring):
Thus the right of "public trial" is not one belonging to the public, but one belonging
to the accused, and inherent in the institutional process by which justice is administered.
But Justice Harlan, in the same concurring opinion, stated:
Once beyond the confines of the courthouse, a newsgathering agency may publicize, within wide limits, what its representatives have heard and seen in the courtroom.
Id. at 589.
52See, e.g., Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings, 107 Ariz. 557,490 P.2d 563 (1971); Phoenix
Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966); Johnson v. Simpson,
433 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. 1968); E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896
(1955); Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171,282 N.E.2d 306, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1972).
53See Cox v. State, 3 Md. App. 136, 137, 238 A.2d 157, 158 (Ct. Spec. App. 1968), where the
court said:
T h e Appellant next contends that the trial judge improperly denied his request for a
private trial. He contends that the right to a public trial is a right belonging solely to the
accused and that the accused may, therefore, waive this right if he so desires.
It is true that the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees to an
accused "the right to a speedy and public trial." But we do not read this guarantee as
carrying with it a right in the accused to demand a private trial. Under our form of
government, secrecy in any phase of its administration is abhorrent; secrecy in the administration of justice is intolerable. Our citizens have the same interest in insuring that fair
play is accorded an accused at trial as they do in seeing that the rights of society are preserved and respected in the trial of an alleged offender against its laws.
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straint on arbitrariness and other abuses of judicial power.S4 Second, an
open forum encourages veracity in the witne~ses.~5
Third, a notified
public may be able to come forth with additional and necessary evidence.56 Finally, and perhaps most important, public trials serve as an
educational tool that operates to instill, in the public, confidence in the
nation's system of justice.57
Since sketching serves, under present strictures, as the only means of
visual communication of courtroom activities,58 a court, by eliminating
sketching, makes trials less public and less open. Those who receive information solely from nonvisual media are less well informed than they
could be were drawings and sketches available. Many rely on television
as one source, or even an exclusive source of news;59 but, as noted above,
54See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948); United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle,
419 F.2d 599,606 (3d Cir. 1969).
55AsBlackstone said:
This open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much
more conducive to the clearing up of truth, than the private and secret examination
taken down in writing before an officer or his clerk in the ecclesiastical courts, and all
others that have borrowed their practice from the civil law; where a witness may frequently depose that, in private, which he will be ashamed to testiQ in a public and solemn
tribunal.
W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
*373. See United States v. American Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 274 F. Supp. 790,794 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
56See Reardon Report, supra note 13, at 50: "Finally, as in the case of reports of arrests and
requests for evidence, reporting of the trial may evoke evidence that will aid in convicting or
exonerating the accused."
S7See, e.g., United States v. American Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp. 274 F. Supp. 790, 794
(W.D. Pa. 1967), where the court said a public trial "has an educative effect which can increase respect for law and provide confidence in judicial remedies."
Most of the various policies underlying public trials were summed up in State v. Haskins,
38 N.J. Super. 250,252, 118 A.2d 707,709 (App. Div. 1955):
[A] public trial serves as a very salutary restraint upon gross abuses of the judicial power,
upon lesser evils, such as indolence or a petty arbitrariness on the part of the judge andany tendency toby exposing witnesses to the eyes and the ears of the public-upon
ward mendacity on their part. There are incidental virtues. By adding a certain formality and solemnity to the trial, it brings to lawyers, and to the jury also, a sense of their
responsibility; and by enabling the community to know what the courts are doing, it
gives a community confidence in its courts.
58See note 13 supra.
59In 1959, a survey asking from which source people get most of their news revealed the
following:
Television
19%
Newspapers
21%
Both newspapers and television (with or without other media)
26%
Newspapers and other media but not television
10%
Television and other media but not newspapers
6%
Media other than television or newspapers
17%
I n 1972, the survey was repeated with the following results:
Television
3370
Newspapers
19%
Both newspapers and television (with or without other media)
26%
Newspapers and other media but not television
5 70
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the effectiveness of television to report the news is dependent on its
ability to use sketches and other visual media.60
Certainly there are departures from the mandate of completely
public trials,e1 but all such departures, including the sketching ban, are
sustainable only if they meet a standard of "strict and inescapable necessity."62 There has never been a showing that the Utah federal court's
sketching ban is necessary, let alone inescapably necessary, to accomplish
an articulated and permissible goal.

C . T h e Sketching Ban and the Requirement of Narrowly Drawn
Restrictions
Overbreadth is the third infirmity of constitutional proportions inherent in the sketching prohibition. The ban extends to civil as well as
to criminal proceedings, to mundane, nonsensational proceedings as well
as to notorious, highly publicized events, to nonjury as well as to jury
trials, to fair as well as to unfair portrayals, to sketches made in the newsroom as well as to sketches made in the courtroom. Seemingly the ban
was promulgated without heed to the principle that "constitutional standards restrict the methods by which a court . . . can limit the press to the
narrowest rules or orders which will accomplish the desired
Or,
in the Supreme Court's articulation of the overbreadth doctrine:
[El ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.64

Yet in attempting to measure the sketching ban against the requirement of "narrowness" or "less drastic means," one is confronted with the
difficulty of identifying the goals or objectives sought to be achieved by
Television and other media but not newspapers
5%
Media other than television or newspapers
12%
THEROPERORGANIZATION,
INC.,WHATPEOPLETHINK
OF TELEVISION
AND OTHERASS MEDIA
1959-1972,at 2-3 (1973).
6oSee note 12 supra and accompanying text.
GIThe public may be excluded from the courtroom in order to preserve order, United States
ex rel. Orlando v. Ray, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966); United
States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949); to insure the safety of witnesses and parties,
United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 957
(1970); and to protect the morals of the public, United States v. Kobli, supra.
62See United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 607 (3d Cir. 1969), where the
court said:
It has always been recognized that any claim of practical justification for a departure
from the constitutional requirement of a public trial must be tested by a standard of strict and inescapable necessity.
63Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558,561 -62 (7th Cir. 1970).
64Sheltonv. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960).
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the prohibition. The court seems not to have been motivated by standard
concerns such as disruption and distraction in the courtroom, prejudicial
publicity affecting an accused's right to fair trial, or a distortion of the
response of jurors, witnesses, and other participants caused by an awareness of the gaze of others (even beyond those present in court) upon
them.65 Rather, the court, in promulgating its prohibition, seems to
have been motivated by a concern for reputational interests, privacy,
and a potential litigant's right of access to the courts.
The court's reasons for the amendment to and extension of the sketching ban, taken from the transcript of the 1973 proceeding at which the
amendment was promulgated, are reproduced in complete, verbatim
form in the appendix to this article. By way of summary, however, the
court asserted that litigants and accused have a right to participate in
judicial proceedings without being exposed to the glare of publicity.
Particularly, such trial participants have a right not to be degraded by
grotesque representations of their physical characteristics which subject
the participant to ridicule and ~onternpt.~6
The existence of such uncomplimentary exposure and publicity, or even the threat thereof, has
a chilling effect on the exercise of one's right to seek justice in the judicial
forum. Rather than face the exposure of uncomplimentary publicity,
potential litigants forego litigation which would otherwise be available
for the vindication of their rights.67
65Seenotes 31-35 supra and accompanying text.
66Transcript of proceedings 33-34, In re KCPX Television Station, C 28-73 (D. Utah, proceedings of Feb. 2, 1973).
Now, the purpose of this order was at the time it was entered, and still is, to protect
people who have business with the federal court and are compelled, if they want to do
business, to come here.

... .
T h e Constitution of the United States of America gives the citizens and other people in
the country the right to a trial, a common law trial, the kind of trial that the founders
knew about in their time. And by that I mean this: Folks have the right to come here
and do their business with the court without being pilloried. They have the right to
come here and do business with the court and not be subjected to ridicule, hatred, contempt, and they have the right to come here and do business with this court without being
held up to degradation by grotesque representations of their physical characteristics.
. . . W e are concerned with people, human beings, who have a constitutional right,
when they are compelled to come here to do business, to be free from being made a public
display of.
67Id. at 37-38.
I t is a tragedy to have to come to court. It is a disaster to have to come to court. Folks
do not come here because they want to. They come here because they have to. And they
have a constitutional right not to be photographed in here, not to be drawn in grotesque
shapes and forms and colors and displayed to the community. There is a very, very wrong
influence in that sort of stuff, and that influence is that some people would rather forego
coming to court and seeking justice, having their rights vindicated, than to be subjected
to notoriety, ridicule, being pilloried in the market place, and so cold chills run up their
spines. They say, "Oh, let's forget it. Let's forget it."
That is a serious, chilling effect upon the need and the desire and the opportunity to
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Laudatory as these concerns for reputational interests, privacy, and
right of access to the courts may be, they cannot sustain the sketching ban
against constitutional attack.
The court attempted to protect reputational interests by suppressing
all communications of courtroom scenes conveyed by one medium,
sketching. The basis of the suppression, apparently, was the fear or belief that sketching would be used to defame. Indeed, the court, in imposing the blanket sketching ban, seemed to proceed on the premise that
not only some but all sketches represent people in grotesque shapes and
in a defamatory style. That premise is not true in fact. Sketching is no
more inherently defamatory than the written word. Yet the court banned
all sketches because some hold the subject up to "ridicule, hatred, [and]
contempt." Such a ban is no more constitutionally sound and permissible than a ban imposed on all books because some books are obscene.
If, however, a sketch is in fact injurious to the subject's reputation, the
injured reputational interests may be vindicated and the rights of a free
press thus curtailed, but only if the evidentiary standards for libel cases
enunciated in Gertz u. Robert Welch, Inc.,68 Curtis Publishing Co. v .
B ~ t t s , 6and
~ New York Times Co. v. Sullivan70 are met. Under the doctrine of the latter two cases, a public official or public figure can successfully prosecute a defamation action only on proof that the reporting was
done with knowledge of the report's falsity or with reckless disregard for
the truth of the publication. Under Gertz, a private individual can hold
the press liable for a libelous report only by proving that the defendant's
conduct in publishing the report amounted at least to negligence. If
such is proven, the plaintiff may then recover a money judgment only for
actual injuries, the existence of which are proven by competent evidence.T1 These principles and evidentiary standards are aimed at preventing a concern for reputational interests, manifested in libel and
slander actions, from unduly restricting or infringing upon the preeminent interest in free expression. It can thus be correctly asserted that
governmental systems designed to protect or vindicate reputational interests, because of their necessary chilling effect on the exercise of free
expression, must be very narrow and limited indeed.
The Utah court, however, in promulgating the sketching ban, disregarded the constitutional principles of New York Times and subsequent cases. The sketching ban, arguably an attempt to balance reputational interests against free expression guarantees, operates to make repuappear in court and have their cases heard.
68418 U.S. 323 (1974).
69388U.S. 130 (1967).
70376U.S. 254 (1964).
"See Note, T h e Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV.
L. REV.41,139-48 (1974) for a general
discussion of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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tational interests not merely preeminent but absolute. The court's ban
does not merely prohibit the defamatory sketch, it absolutely prohibits
all sketches of courtroom scenes.
Neither can a system designed to protect privacy interests be sufficiently broad, within current constitutional strictures, to validate the court's
sketching prohibition. While there is undoubtedly a right to privacy of
constitutional dimensions,72 the right does have outer boundaries which
simply do not reach far enough to sustain the sketching ban. First, one
cannot demand in a public forum the same degree of privacy and freedom from exposure that one can rightfully claim in the confines of the
home. In other words, substantive privacy stops where the public forum
begins.73 And though in some contexts there may be a dispute as to what
constitutes a public forum or to what degree of publicity the forum is
susceptible, there is no doubt that the courtroom, in all its normal uses,
is a public forum. The Supreme Court declared in Craig u. H a r n e ~ ~ ~
that:
A trial is a public event. What transpires in the courtroom is public
property. . . . Those who see and hear what transpired can report it with
impunity. There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables
it, as distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, to
suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in proceedings before it.

Secondly, when the right to privacy clashes with freedom of the press,
particularly the right of the media to report newsworthy happenings, free
press prevails. Only if the news reporting is done with actual malice, that
is, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, may the right
to privacy be vindicated and the rights of a free press curtailed. Such is
the holding and measure of Time, Inc. u. Hi11,75 where the Court said:
Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of
life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential
incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom
of speech and of press. 76
72See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
73Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) with Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397
U.S. 728 (1970).
T h e Court has said on occasion that the fourth amendment right of privacy protects people,
not places, see, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 US. 347, 351 (1967), but "[allthough the
Supreme Court has repeatedly denied that the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of
places rather than people, it has yet to produce a Fourth Amendment holding which does not
depend on the nature of the place where the unreasonable search or seizure took place." Note,
Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALEL.J. 1462, 1457 (1973).
It should be noted that the broad right to privacy discussed in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), and based on elements of the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth
amendments, was used in that case to vindicate the privacy of a very private place- the
marital bedroom.
7*331U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
75385U.S. 374 (1965).
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There is no right of privacy, constitutional or otherwise, sufficiently
broad in scope and potency to sustain the overly restrictive sketching ban
of Utah's federal district court.
The sketching ban is justified also, it is argued, because the threat
of unfavorable publicity and exposure attendant upon litigation has a
chilling effect upon the exercise of the right to litigate. The sketching
ban, therefore, seeks to minimize that chilling effect by eliminating or
greatly reducing publicity of courtroom events. This chilling-effect
argument, certainly novel, contains fundamental difficulties. First, the
argument is based on the unproven factual premise that people actually
forego litigation rather than face the risk of public exposure. That
factual premise may be true. The contrary is not asserted here, though
the ever-increasing civil caseload of the courts would tend to indicate
that the factual premise of the chilling argument is erroneous.77 And it
can be noted that in the present situation, no litigant is alleging a chilling effect and requesting protection therefrom. Rather, the court, on an
untested, unproven factual premise, offers protection against the supposed chill by promulgating an order that substantially infringes upon
first amendment rights of free expression and fifth and sixth amendment
rights of public trial. It seems not too much to ask that, before a substantial restriction on fundamental personal liberties is imposed, the factual
basis of that restriction be demonstrated by some type of convincing empirical evidence. No such evidence has appeared to support the sketching
ban.
Even granting, however, that the court's factual premise is correct,
there remain grave questions whether the sketching ban represents the
proper balance between, on the one hand, the above described interests
in free expression and public trial and, on the other, the right to litigate
in the federal judicial forum. The long-standing American tradition of
public trials, enshrined in part in the sixth amendment, militates against
the sketching ban. Not only has the courtroom traditionally been an
open forum (in a physical sense), but journalists have repeatedly been
protected in their right to report on what they witness in c0urt.~8And
court records, often containing a verbatim account of courtroom proceedings, are open to the public.79 Only in exceptional circumstances is

76Zd. at 388.
77111 1960, there were 51,062 civil (i.e., noncriminal, nonbankruptcy) cases filed in the
federal district courts; in 1970, 82,665. P. BATOR,
P. MISKIN,
D. SHAPIRO
& H. WECHSLER,
THE
FEDERAL
COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM
51 (2d ed. 1973).
78See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972).
791n Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 43 U.S.L.W. 4343 (U.S. March 3, 1975), the Supreme
Court reviewed a Georgia statute forbidding the publication of the names of rape victims.
The Court identified the issue and gave its holding in these words:

42

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I 975:

the courtroom a forum of limited exposure.80
Further, a press entitled to report on judicial proceedings by effective
means such as sketching confers a substantial benefit on society. A free
press reports abuses of delegated judicial power, perversions of adversary
processes, and concomitant miscarriages of justice. A public awareness
of such evils will, if the evils are sufficiently grave and the awareness thereof sufficiently keen, lead to reform. Successful reform of the justice system, that is, reform that eradicates the evils exposed, preserves and enhances the value of the right to litigate within that system.B1 Yet the Utah
federal district court with its sketching ban seeks to preserve the right to
litigate by curtailing those very institutions -public trial and free
press which have traditionally operated to make the right meaningfill.

-

D. Sketching in Court and the Judge's Discretion
Much that has already been said herein concerning the courtroom as
a public place, the right of the media to report courtroom happenings,
[The issue is] whether the State may impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the
name of a rape victim obtained from public records- more specifically, from judicial
records which are maintained in connection with a public prosecution and which themselves are open to public inspection. We are convinced that the State may not do so.
Id. at 4350.
T h e Cox Broadcasting case is also important for its treatment of the right of privacy-free
press conflict. See notes 72-76 supra and accompanying text. The appellee (a private citizen)
claimed a right to be free from unwanted publicity (about his affairs) which would be offensive
to a man of ordinary sensitivities. Id. at 4349. The Court, however, held that the appellee
did not have a right to privacy sufficiently broad in scope to prevent the press from reporting
fully the events of a judicial proceeding.
Appellee has claimed in this litigation that the efforts of the press have infringed his
right to privacy by broadcasting to the world the fact that his daughter was a rape victim.
T h e commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings arising
from the prosecutions, however, are without question events of legitimate concern to the
public and consequently fall within the responsibility of the press to report the operations
of government.
Id. at 4350 (emphasis added).
80Hearings in juvenile courts are generally closed, i.e., the general public is excluded. See,
e.g., NEV. REV.STAT. 62.193(1) (1971).
For other examples of instances where all or part of the public may be excluded from the
courtroom, see note 61 supra.
S1This principle was recently articulated by Mr. Justice White, speaking for an eight-man
majority (Justice Rehnquist dissented on jurisdictional grounds) in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 43 U.S.L.W. 4343,4350 ( U S . March 3,1975):
In the first place, in a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies
necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those operations. . . . Without the information provided by the press most of us and many of our
representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of government generally. With respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the press sewes to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to
bear the beneficial effects of pu blic scrutiny upon the adminzstration ofjustice.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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and the danger of overbroad restrictions applies to the more narrow aspect of the sketching ban - the prohibition on sketching i n the courtroom. However, an additional element is involved with the in-court
sketching ban: the trial judge's broad discretion to control courtroom
activity, or stated differently, the judge's power to maintain order.82 But
a power to maintain order should not include the power to control that
which is not disruptive or distracting where other legitimate interests
are involved. There needs to be a limit or restraint on a trial court's
order-keeping power to prevent that power from being arbitrarily and
broadly exercised to satisfy a judge's personal whims. Therefore, before
a trial judge can exercise his order-keeping power to prohibit an activity
in the courtroom, there must be an actual showing that the activity is obtrusive or disruptive. Such is the holding of C o l u m b i a B r o a d ~ a s t i n g : ~
where the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a blanket ban on
in-court sketching imposed by a federal district court. The court recognized the trial judge's broad discretion to control courtroom activity but
concluded that without evidence that sketching is in some way obtrusive
or disruptive, the sweeping prohibition of in-court sketching could not
be condoned. The panel was unanimously and "firmly of the view that
the restraint imposed by the court below is overly broad and thus
invalid. "84
Sketching is not inherently disruptive. T h e person who draws in the
courtroom can do so, if he desires, with little more distraction to the participants than one who takes pencil notes. Orderly sketching in the courtroom is, therefore, simply not an activity that can be controlled or regulated by a trial judge's order-keeping power.

The Salt Lake City media have failed to take legal action to challenge
the local rule prohibiting the drawing of courtroom scenes. Some media
representatives have advanced as a reason for this inaction a reluctance to
violate the order, undergo prosecution for contempt, and suffer a a i m i nal conviction all for the sole purpose of testing the validity of the rule
in a higher court.g5 But a criminal contempt proceeding is not the only
procedure available for challenging the constitutionality of the local
rule. Television and newspaper representatives have available to them,
g2See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 497 F.2d 102, 106-07 (5th Cir. 1974)
(ordinarily the trial judge has extremely broad discretion to control courtroom activity).
WJnited States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974). See notes 2528 supra and accompanying text.
84Zd.at 107.
*51n United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972), see text accompanying notes
45-46 supra, the appellate court struck down the court order violated by the conternnors but
held that, in the circumstances of the case, the order could not be disregarded with impunity.
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as effective procedural alternatives with which to challenge the rule,
either an action for declaratory judgment86 or a petition for an extraId. at 509. The court relied on the "well-established principle in proceedings for criminal
contempt that an injunction duly issuing out of a court having. . . jurisdiction must be obeyed,
irrespective of the ultimate validity of the order. Invalidity is no defense to criminal contempt." Id. (emphasis in original). See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
The case was remanded to the district court for a determination as to whether or not it would
still consider the conduct contemptuous in view of the appellate court's decision that the
order violated was unconstitutional. The district court, on remand, sustained the contempt
conviction. United States v. Dickinson, 349 F. Supp. 227 (M.D. La. 1972).
Testing the validity of a court order in a contempt proceeding is thus an extremely risky
undertaking.
86Both the legislative history of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. $5 2201-02
(1970), and subsequent judicial treatment of the Act indicate that the declaratory judgment
procedure may be properly invoked to challenge a local rule of court.
From the legislative history of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, it is clear that Congress intended that interested parties who desired to test the validity or meaning of a statute
carrying penalties not be forced to violate the statute and thus face the risks of testing constitutionality in a criminal prosecution. Congress intended the declaratory judgment action
to serve as a less risky, less dangerous procedural alternative. The Senate committee report
on the proposed Federal Declaratory Judgment Act stated:
The [declaratory judgment] procedure [in the States] has been especially useful in
avoiding the necessity, now so often present, of having to act at one's peril or to act on
one's own interpretation of his rights, or abandon one's rights because of a fear of incurring damages. So now it is often necessary, in the absence of the declaratory judgment
procedure to violate or purport to violate a statute in order to obtain a judicial determination of its meaning or validity.
S. REP.NO. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1934).
Professor Borchard, the great and long-time champion of a federal declaratory judgment
act, submitted a written statement at the congressional hearing on the Act containing an
explanation of one role of the declaratory judgment procedure:
[TI he declaratory judgment serves another useful purpose. It often happens that courts
are unwilling to grant injunctions to restrain the enforcement of penal statutes or ordinances, and relegate the plaintiff to his option, either to violate the statute and take
his chances in testing constitutionality on a criminal prosecution, or else to forego, in the
fear of prosecution, the exercise of his claimed rights. Into this dilemma no civilized legal
system operating under a constitution should force any person. The court, in effect, by
refusing an injunction informs the prospective victim that the only way to determine
whether the suspect is a mushroom or a toadstool, is to eat it. Assuming that the plaintiff
has a vital interest in the enforcement of the challenged statute or ordinance, there is
no reason why a declaratory judgment should not be issued, instead of compelling a violation of the statute as a condition precedent to challenging its constitutionality.
Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subconz. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th Cong.,
1st Sess. 75-76 (1928).
Recent Supreme Court decisions have reemphasized that Congress intended, with the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, to provide a means for testing the validity of statutes carrying criminal penalties. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Perez v. Ledesma,
401 U.S. 82, 93 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S.
241 (1967).
Recent case law also supports the contention that the declaratory judgment procedure
may be properly invoked to challenge a local rule of a federal district court. When Judge
Richard Austin of Chicago promulgated a local rule prohibiting photography not only in the
courtroom and its immediate environs but also in virtually the entire Federal Courthouse and
Office Building, including the ground floors (19 floors from the nearest courtroom), the
plaza (a site of frequent demonstrations), and the sidewalks surrounding the buildings, certain news photographers brought a class action seeking a declaration that the rule was invalid

BAN ON COURTROOM SKETCHING

ordinary writ such as mandamus or prohibition.g7 Either alternative can
be used without subjecting the media to the risks of a criminal prosecution.
Yet even in the absence of these procedural alternatives, it can seriously be contemplated whether the media are justified in acquiescing in an
unconstitutional rule which infringes important first, fifth, and sixth
amendment rights because of the possible criminal penalties violation of
and an injunction against its enforcement. Both the United States Attorney and the United
States Marshall for the district were named as defendants. T h e judge was not joined. After
the district court dismissed the complaint, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously
reversed. Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1970). T h e appellate court held that
the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaratory judgment to the effect that the local rule went
beyond the scope of the first amendment and to an injunction prohibiting enforcement of
those parts of the rule declared invalid. Id. at 561.
*'The power to issue writs of mandamus or prohibition to a district court judge is conferred
upon the federal circuit courts of appeal by the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 5 1651 (1970). Concededly, the proper use or scope of that power is difficult to ascertain. But whatever may be
the limitations upon the use of an extraordinary writ in other circumstances, it appears clear
that a circuit court of appeals properly exercises its power under the All Writs Act when it
issues a writ to nullify an unlawful or unconstitutional local rule of a district court. For
example, when a district court promulgated a local rule limiting the pro hac vice appearance
of out-of-state attorneys, certain of the affected attorneys filed petitions in the circuit court
of appeals for writs of mandamus to determine the validity of the rule. Sanders v. Russell,
401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968). T h e respondent district court judges asserted (1) that the court
of appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions for mandamus because the appellate
court had no supervisory power to question rules promulgated by a district court; and (2)
that mandamus was not the proper remedy. The circuit court of appeals responded that
[ t ]hese arguments are patently without m e r i t . . . . [ T ] here is n o doubt of our superuisory
power by the grant of a writ of mandamus to prohibit the District Court from enforcing its
rule." Id. at 244 (emphasis added). Proceeding to the substantive issue of whether enforcement of the local rule should be prohibited, the court found that the rule contravened what
it termed the "congressional intent" or policy to facilitate proceedings in vindication of civil
rights brought or sought to be brought in federal court. Though the local rule possibly contained infirmities of constitutional dimensions, the court did not reach those issues. On the
more narrow basis that the rule contravened congressional intent, the court declared the
local rule invalid and issued a writ of mandamus against its enforcement. Id. at 244-48.
T h e declaration in Sanders v. Russell, supra, affirming the existence of a supervisory power
in the circuit courts of appeal operative on the district courts though the extraordinary writs
is well founded. See 9 J. MOORE,FEDERAL
PRACTICE
7 110.28, at 305-06, 312-13 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as ~ ~ O O R EThough
].
the extent of the appellate courts' power to issue
writs of mandamus is often treated as a "jurisdictional" question, the courts have never
limited themselves to an arbitrary and technical definition of "jurisdiction" as the word is
used in section 1651. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967). See 9 MOORE 110.26, at
283-84. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has declared that "exceptional circumstances amounting to judicial 'usurpation of power' will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy." Will v. United States, supra at 95.
Indeed, in the case of LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957), the High Court
expressly affirmed the existence, finding it inherent in the All Writs Act, of the circuit courts'
supervisory power over the district courts. Id. at 259-60. T h e circuit courts are obligated to
exercise this supervisory power with sound discretion, but where there is no normal process of
appeal by which judicial action can be reviewed, as is certainly the case when a district court
promulgates a local rule general in application and not tied to any specific pending litigation, an extraordinary writ is, in the words of the All Writs Act, both "necessary" and "proper."
In such a case, a writ would issue as an appropriate exercise of the circuit court's discretion.
9 MOORE7 110.26, at 284-85. See Sanders v. Russell, supra.
"
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the rule would entail. Justice Black once observed, "If there is any one
thing that could strongly indicate that the Founders were wrong in reposing so much trust in a free press, I would suggest that it would be for
the press itself not to wake up to the grave danger to its freedom . . . ."88
The duty to preserve the rights of a free press rests first, rightfully, on the
press.89 The media should challenge the sketching ban.

Now, the purpose of this order was at the time it was entered, and still
is, to protect people who have business with the federal court and are
compelled, if they want to do business, to come here.
Some are brought by the United States Government under arrest.
More come here because they have business with the court, have a lawsuit pending, have to come here to attend the bankruptcy court.
T h e founders of this nation 200 years ago wrote a Constitution, and
we operate under that Constitution in this court. And you people are
the beneficiaries of the wisdom of the founders who gave us the Constitution.
Now, there is a very important matter here. The Constitution of the
United States of America gives the citizens and other people in the
country the right to a trial, a common law trial, the kind of trial that the
founders knew about in their time. And by that I mean this: Folks have
the right to come here and do their business with the court without being
pilloried. They have the right to come here and do business with the
court and not be subjected to ridicule, hatred, contempt, and they have
the right to come here and do business with this court without being held
up to degradation by grotesque representations of their physical characteristics.
We are not concerned with the geography of this courtroom. We are
not concerned with the tables and chairs and the windows and doors and
the contents. We are concerned with people, human beings, who have a
constitutional right when they are compelled to come here to do business,
88Time,Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,400 (1967) (concurring opinion).
89Under current doctrines on standing, it is doubtful that a member of the public in his
role as a receiver of the news could successfully maintain an action attacking the sketching
ban. Probably, only the media can successfully meet the requirements of standing. See, e.g.,
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); cJ: Association of Data Processing Service
Organ v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
*In a 1973 hearing, the Utah federal district court prohibited, by amendment to a 1969
general order, all sketches of courtroom scenes regardless of where made. See notes 3-5 supra
and accompanying text. At that hearing the court articulated the purposes and policies underlying both the 1969 general order and the 1973 amendment. T h e statement is reproduced
in this appendix. I t is taken verbatim from the reporter's transcript of the hearing. Transcript
of Proceedings 33-39, In re KCPX Television Station, C 28-73 (D. Utah, proceedings of Feb.
2,1973).
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to be free from being made a public display of.
Now, that goes not only for television and radio, it goes for the newspapers. Since I have been here nobody, nobody at all, has made a photograph in this courtroom, and as long as I am here nobody will. People
have a constitutional right to be fiee from that kind of harassment, that
kind of an interference with their constitutional right to a trial in a courtroom that is quiet, serene, where gentlemen talk about the law, where
witnesses are examined, cross-examined, and where the jurors sit there
and observe what is going on without the fear, the indimidation, the
ridicule of unwanted photographs or grotesque cartoons or caricatures.
Now, you have seen a lot of that this week. It started with KCPX. I t
is not finished yet.
I said citizens are entitled to come here and not be pilloried. At the
time this Constitution was written it was the practice for the establishment in the various communities to haul the unfortunate persons, whoever they might be, male or female, down to the market place, put them
in stocks and display them. This was the purpose, to display them to the
curious. That appealed to prejudice and ignorance. And these cartoons,
in the court's view of it, and the stations that run them, appeal to those in
the community who are ignorant and prejudiced.
And there is a constitutional right of people who must come here to
have their business transacted not to have that done.
Now, that is the purpose of this order, was then, is now.
Now, the suggestion is made that this order read carefully doesn't reach
a fellow who came in here at twelve ten, while the judge was out of the
room and the marshals were out of the room and there was no supervision in here. He says he spent ten minutes, he saw the defendant, the
plaintiff in the lawsuit, and then he spent all afternoon until four o'clock
doing something else away from the courtroom. And then he says he
made these cartoons over there. That doesn't improve the situation very
much, because it adds to the unreliable and grotesque character of his
product. Instead of being anywhere near exact, anywhere near precise,
anywhere near a fair representation of this room and the people in it, it
was what he was thinking about then he would like to put in that caricature.
Now, I saw that on the eleven o'clock news myself, so I know what it
was. It is my duty as the judge of this court to see that the guarantees of
the Constitution of the United States are effected. This is a constitutional court. It was not created in the Constitution. Congress was empowered to set up the federal courts and the intermediate appellate
courts, but it was contemplated by the founders. And it is here, as all you
folks know very well, that the cases come in which people are complaining about the violation of their constitutional rights.
Now, in the Barker case the plaintiffs were here complaining about
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the violation of their constitutional rights, and in my view of it KCPX
was in the process at the same time of violating another consittutional
right of those poor, unfortunate people to have to come here.
I t is a tragedy to have to come to court. I t is a disaster to have to come
to court. Folks do not come here because they want to. They come here
because they have to. And they have a constitutional right not to be photographed in here, not to be drawn in grotesque shapes and forms and
colors and displayed to the community. There is a very, very wrong influence in that sort of stuff,and that influence is that some people would
rather forego coming to court and seeking justice, having their rights
vindicated, than to be subjected to notoriety, ridicule, being pilloried in
the market place, and so cold chills run up their spines. They say, "Oh,
let's forget it. Let's forget it."
That is a serious, chilling effect upon the need and the desire and the
opportunity to appear in court and have their cases heard.
Now, this is not a small matter. In my view it is of the utmost importance.
Now, I have just read this order, and I must say to you, in all frankness, that I think the people at KCPX were entitled to interpret it as
they say they did. There is that avenue of escape from the express terms
of what I wrote, but there is no escape, no escape at all, from the spirit
and purpose of this order.
T h e vice is not whether he drew something in here or out of here; the
vice is the pillory, the ridicule, the holding people up to hatred, contempt, degradation. It is not hard to find words for it.
Now, the order is hereby amended, effective this date at 11:10,
amended by adding this sentence:
The broadcasting or reporting for broadcasting by the radio, television,
or other means, including the newspapers, whether done in the courtroom or its environs, in connection with any judicial proceeding, is
hereby prohibited, whether court is actually in session or not - and emphasize -whether the cartoons, artists' drawings, caricatures, or whatever they may be called, are made on these premises or elsewhere.

